2003 Blackout Analysis Superb Edu on Power Grid

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2003 Blackout Analysis Superb Edu on Power Grid

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KciAzYfXNwU

Excellent analysis and info.

“Three trees and a computer bug caused a major part of North American [power] to completely grind to a halt. If you had asked anyone working in the power industry the prior day about catastrophic loss of service the next day…”

From the comments:

jay152277

1 year ago

The power plant in the very first frame, next to the United Nations building in Manhattan, that’s where I was… in the control room as a very young Engineer. I was actually giving a tour of our control room and flipping through some system graphics, when all 3 units tripped offline at nearly the same time, and the plant went completely dark, which before then was thought to be impossible. One of the operators actually yelled at me because he thought it was my fault, lol… I was relieved when the system operator called a few minutes later, and told us to, “Standby, we just lost the entire Northeast.” We overcame a lot of challenges that evening, and for a young Engineer, it was exciting. I slept on the roof that night because it was too hot inside. I remember looking up at the night sky and seeing the stars, and thinking… when was the last time anyone in Manhattan looked up at the night sky and saw the stars like this? Great job on the video, and thanks for bringing back such great memories.

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Damn…I just remembered how amazing that outage was. A bunch of us kids in the neighborhood had sleepovers, people were just going to each other’s houses. We were playing in the streets. There was such a strange and unique coming together of humans where I was. As soon as the power came back, people started to go on about their usual business and that special moment was gone.

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The Lift Pump Station located near Ludington, Michigan helped save the entire eastern half of the US and Canadian power grids. This facility maintained grid frequency by absorbing most of the nearly 5 GW load imbalance as the disconnects around Lake Erie engaged. The pump station filled itself to the brim, well past its safe design water surface elevation, then ran itself nearly dry, again outside of safe operating levels and at great risk of causing cavitation in the turbines to provide power afterwards. These actions helped prevent catastrophic damage cascading all the way to Denver and gave some time for other stations to reconnect. If a power station is scrammed, a rapid shutdown, and depending on its type it can take days if not weeks to get a power station back up and running. A pump station can provide nearly immediate power generation. Thank you to all of the station operators, line workers and service crews who struggled on that day, your actions and quick thinking, kept the lights on east of the Rockies and prevented a far darker outcome. Both the 2003 and the Texas outages could have been much worse if the load imbalances had been allowed to progress a few minutes or even seconds longer. The control systems in place now are night and day more robust than what was present in 2003.

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Bill Moran

1 year ago

I’m a retired utility engineer and was working that day as a consulting engineer. You gave the best explanation of the August 2003 blackout that I’ve heard. One thing that needs to be said is that the power grid in the US is itself the largest and most complex“machine” ever built by man. While it’s reliability has been amazingly good, it’s really limited to our understanding of every conceivable event. It still requires the human mind to interpret events and make on the spot decisions. If this human intervention is not present, a cascading outage is the results. All major outages are a result of the lack of timely operator intervention. One major factor is that the system itself is composed of protection equipment that ranges in age from current technology to devices over 100 years old. It all has to operate together. It’s simply not possible economically to upgrade the entire system at one time. The best that can be done is to plan for every contingency we can identify and have an operating plan that addresses those contingencies. As computers and Artificial Intelligence become more capable, we can analyze more contingencies and anticipate more events. However we then become more vulnerable when the technology itself fails. It’s a balancing act. Most of the time we get it right. Sometimes we run into a situation we never anticipated. I doubt it will ever be possible to completely remove the human factor from the operation of the power grid, nor would that be in our best interest.

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phuturephunk

1 year ago (edited)

I’m not gonna lie, as someone who was in NYC during this, Manhattan specifically, it was actually really fun. Gas service was still going so restaurants were cooking and effectively giving away all the food they had built up, everyone was out on the street ( who wasn’t trudging across a bridge) was drinking. Driving…yes driving…was actually really easy because traffic was self moderating. It was a very surreal experience, all told. Spent the day after that first night out in Brooklyn by the water drinking with friends and then hung out at my friend’s place on the west side and watched them switch the super blocks back on one by one. Looking up 8th avenue, it was kind of amazing. From the horizon you could see entire sections of Manhattan switch on, I wanna say like 10 block squares at a time coming towards where we were down in the 30’s.

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CONNECTIONS season 1 episode 1 by JAMES BURKE titled THE TRIGGER EFFECT has an excellent analysis of the 70s blackout — and it also includes an incredible predictive-pre-program for the 9/11 event. You should take a look and marvel at the mind control.

Graham Gissing

1 year ago

I’m a power systems protection engineer and confirm that this is a very informative and accurate representation of how protection would react in this situation. Really pleased that he got distance protection correct. I wonder whether Load Blinders on the distance relay characteristics would have prevented the cascade or would the reduction in frequency and voltage have led to the cascade being inevitable.

The 2003 blackout, often referred to as the Northeast blackout of 2003, was a massive power outage that affected parts of the northeastern and midwestern United States, as well as parts of Ontario, Canada, on August 14, 2003. The blackout was one of the largest in North American history and had significant impacts on millions of people, including disruptions to transportation, communication, and economic activity.

The analysis of the 2003 blackout provides valuable insights into the vulnerabilities and challenges faced by modern power grids, as well as lessons learned for improving grid reliability and resilience. Some key aspects of the analysis include:

1. **Causes and Triggers**: The blackout was triggered by a series of events, including equipment failures, overgrown trees coming into contact with power lines, and software bugs in the alarm system at a utility company. These events, combined with inadequate system monitoring and coordination, led to a cascading failure that resulted in the widespread blackout.

2. **Systemic Vulnerabilities**: The blackout highlighted systemic vulnerabilities in the power grid, including inadequate monitoring and control systems, lack of coordination between utilities and grid operators, and insufficient investment in grid infrastructure and maintenance. These vulnerabilities allowed relatively minor issues to escalate into a large-scale blackout affecting multiple regions.

3. **Cascading Failures**: The blackout demonstrated how failures in one part of the grid can cascade and propagate throughout the entire system, leading to widespread outages. The interconnected nature of power grids makes them susceptible to cascading failures, as disruptions in one area can overload neighboring systems and cause further failures.

4. **Response and Recovery Efforts**: Following the blackout, extensive efforts were made to restore power to affected areas and investigate the root causes of the outage. These efforts included deploying emergency generators, coordinating restoration efforts between utility companies and government agencies, and implementing measures to prevent similar outages in the future.

5. **Policy and Regulatory Changes**: The blackout prompted policymakers and regulators to reassess grid reliability and implement changes to improve resilience and prevent future outages. These changes included updating regulations, investing in grid modernization and infrastructure upgrades, and enhancing coordination and communication between utilities and grid operators.

Overall, the analysis of the 2003 blackout provides important lessons for improving the reliability and resilience of power grids, including the need for better monitoring and control systems, investment in infrastructure and maintenance, and coordination between stakeholders. By learning from past events like the 2003 blackout, we can work towards building more robust and resilient energy systems for the future.

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2003 Blackout Analysis Superb Edu on Power Grid

jay152277

Bill Moran

phuturephunk

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